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Actual knowledge

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  19 November 2021

Jonathan Phillips Open the ORCID record for Jonathan Phillips [Opens in a new window] ,
Wesley Buckwalter ,
Fiery Cushman ,
Ori Friedman ,
Alia Martin ,
John Turri ,
Laurie Santos  and
Joshua Knobe
Jonathan Phillips
Affiliation:
Program in Cognitive Science, Department of Psychological and Brain Sciences and Department of Philosophy, Dartmouth College, Hanover, NH03755, USAjonathan.s.phillips@dartmouth.edu; https://phillab.host.dartmouth.edu/
Wesley Buckwalter
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, Institute for Philosophy and Public Policy, George Mason University, Fairfax, VA22030, USAwesleybuckwalter@gmail.com; https://wesleybuckwalter.org/
Fiery Cushman
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA02138, USAcushman@fas.harvard.edu; http://cushmanlab.fas.harvard.edu/
Ori Friedman
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, University of Waterloo, Waterloo, ONN2L 3G1, Canadafriedman@uwaterloo.ca; https://sites.google.com/view/uwaterloocclab
Alia Martin
Affiliation:
School of Psychology, Victoria University of Wellington, Wellington6012, New Zealandalia.martin@vuw.ac.nz; https://vuwbabylab.com/
John Turri
Affiliation:
Philosophy Department and Cognitive Science Program, University of Waterloo, Waterloo, ONN2L 3G1, Canadajohn.turri@gmail.com; https://john.turri.org/
Laurie Santos
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, Yale University, New Haven, CT06520, USAlaurie.santos@yale.edu; https://caplab.yale.edu/
Joshua Knobe
Affiliation:
Program in Cognitive Science, Department of Philosophy, Yale University, New Haven, CT06520, USA. joshua.knobe@yale.edu; https://campuspress.yale.edu/joshuaknobe/
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Abstract

This response argues that when you represent others as knowing something, you represent their mind as being related to the actual world. This feature of knowledge explains the limits of knowledge attribution, how knowledge differs from belief, and why knowledge underwrites learning from others. We hope this vision for how knowledge works spurs a new era in theory of mind research.

Type
Authors’ Response
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 44 , 2021 , e177
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Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2021. Published by Cambridge University Press

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