Hostname: page-component-cd9895bd7-q99xh Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-12-27T05:30:17.008Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Representation and misrepresentation of knowledge

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  19 November 2021

Mikkel Gerken Open the ORCID record for Mikkel Gerken [Opens in a new window]
Mikkel Gerken*
Affiliation:
University of Southern Denmark, Campusvej 55, 5230Odense M, Denmark. mikkel@sdu.dk; https://sites.google.com/site/mikkelgerken/
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

I argue for three points: First, evidence of the primacy of knowledge representation is not evidence of primacy of knowledge. Second, knowledge-oriented mindreading research should also focus on misrepresentations and biased representations of knowledge. Third, knowledge-oriented mindreading research must confront the problem of the gold standard that arises when disagreement about knowledge complicates the interpretation of empirical findings.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 44 , 2021 , e153
Check for updates
Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2021. Published by Cambridge University Press

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Apperly, I. A. (2011). Mindreaders. The cognitive basis of theory of mind. Psychology Press.Google Scholar
DeRose, K. (2009). The case for contextualism. Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Dinges, A. (2018). Knowledge and availability. Philosophical Psychology, 31(4), 554–573.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Fricker, M. (2013). Epistemic justice as a condition of political freedom? Synthese, 190(7), 1317–1332.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Gerken, M. (2017a). On folk epistemology. How we think and talk about knowledge. Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Gerken, M. (2017b). Against knowledge-first epistemology. In A. Gordon, J. Carter, (Eds.), Knowledge-first approaches in epistemology and mind (pp. 46–71). Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Gerken, M. (2019) Pragmatic encroachment and the challenge from epistemic injustice. Philosophers' Imprint, 19(15), 1–19.Google Scholar
Gerken, M., Alexander, J., Gonnerman, C., & Waterman, J. (2020). Salient alternatives in perspective. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 98(4), 792–810.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Gerken, M., & Beebe, J. R. (2016). Knowledge in and out of contrast. Noûs, 50(1), 133–164.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Nagel, J. (2008). Knowledge ascriptions and the psychological consequences of changing stakes. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 86, 279–294.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Saxe, R. (2005). Against simulation: The argument from error. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 9(4), 174–179.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Schaffer, J., & Knobe, J. (2012). Contrastive knowledge surveyed. Noûs, 46(4), 675–708.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Spaulding, S. (2018). How we understand others: Philosophy and social cognition. Routledge.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Stanley, J. (2005). Knowledge and practical interests. Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Turri, J. (2015). Skeptical appeal: The source-content bias. Cognitive Science, 38(5), 307–324.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Wellman, H., Cross, D., & Watson, J. (2001). Meta-analysis of theory of mind development: The truth about false-belief. Child Development, 72(3), 655–684.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Williamson, T. (2000). Knowledge and its limits. Oxford University Press.Google Scholar