Japan is the only place in the world where bananas are marketed and priced by cultivation altitude. In the late 1980s, plantation managers sourcing the fruit from the southern Philippine region of Mindanao discovered a paradigm-shifting formula: the higher up one grew, the sweeter the bananas became. And the sweeter the bananas were, the closer they were to replicating the taste of colonial Taiwanese bananas, lost in the switch to Philippine supply. This paper offers the first transnational history of the banana’s transition along the spectrum from a fungible commodity to a nonfungible product in the Asia-Pacific region. Engaging critical studies of commodities and plantations, it takes fungibility as the characteristic that makes goods interchangeable and as the principle that renders landscape and labor as empty vessels open to the projection of others’ desires. The paper argues that the introduction of kōchi saibai banana or “highland cultivated bananas” for the Japanese market brought not the reversal of fungible life to the Philippine highlands but rather its continuation. In so doing, this work critiques conceptual frameworks that understand fungibility through the idioms of liquidification and immateriality. Instead, it proposes a topographical approach, which sees processes of fungibilization as operating through the profoundly material rearrangement of human and environmental communities. By focusing on the tensions between fungibility and differentiation, this paper offers an account of both an idiosyncratic marketing strategy particular to the Philippines and Japan, and a dynamic that pervades the creation of all commodities under capitalism.

US legislators show a remarkable variation in how many bills and resolutions they sponsor and cosponsor to support Taiwan. I argue that legislators’ perception of China and their partisan identity play a crucial role in shaping their support for Taiwan. To test my hypotheses, I conducted a quantitative analysis of all Taiwan-specific bills and resolutions introduced from the 110th to 116th House of Representatives. The results indicate that legislators who view China as a security threat to the US or a non-democracy and a human rights violator exhibit a higher level of support for Taiwan. However, seeing China as an economic challenger has the least significant effect. Furthermore, although there is a general consensus that Taiwan is a bipartisan issue in Congress, my research demonstrates that Republicans display a greater level of interest in supporting Taiwan compared to Democrats.

Hunting, habitat loss and fragmentation have caused a rapid decline in the distribution and abundance of the clouded leopard Neofelis nebulosa across its range, and in several areas, including Taiwan, the species is now extirpated. Taiwan, a former stronghold for the species, is a candidate for its reintroduction, based on increasing prey abundance and high forest coverage. Such future reintroduction efforts, however, are hampered by a lack of analysis of potential clouded leopard habitat on the island. To address this, we explore habitat suitability for the species in Taiwan. We used a multi-scale, multivariate habitat selection model based on clouded leopard presence–absence data from extensive camera-trap surveys across its current range to predict suitable habitat in Taiwan. Our findings indicate that 38% of Taiwanese territory is potentially suitable habitat for the clouded leopard, of which 46% is under protection. This demonstrates the high potential of Taiwan's habitat for clouded leopard reintroduction.

Space as a domain of economic and security competition between great powers has risen to become an arena of active statecraft for middle powers in the twenty-first century. It has set a high-stake stage for not only continuing struggles for catch-up industrialization of late developers but also offering opportunities to capture commercial gains of technological breakthroughs and globalization of markets. We examine these challenges for Taiwan and Thailand, surveying major trends in the emerging space industry and exploring four analytical perspectives on how government-business relations shape adaptive national industrial policies in high-technology sectors with proliferating end-users. We argue that the Asian developmental state model is evolving in response to specific challenges of a global supply chain for commercial space activities dominated by leading space firms and government regulatory actions in the United States. Significant differences in Taiwan’s and Thailand’s space and industrial policy approaches will likely create divergent technological trajectories and reinforce current constraints on improving national security. The longer-term prospect for middle spacepowers remains contingent on the space race between the United States and the People’s Republic of China.

The International Political Science Association (IPSA) is a unique case against the common perception that Beijing has the upper hand when the two regimes by the Taiwan Strait contest to join international (non-governmental) organisations. Beijing relentlessly pushes international organisations to acknowledge the One China principle; Taipei also relentlessly denies this principle while it seeks to join. In the 1980s, Chinese and Taiwanese political scientists, representing their own regimes, applied Track II diplomacy to compete over membership of this organisation. IPSA membership mattered to both regimes and their political scientists. After many years of Track II competition, The Chinese Association of Political Science in Taipei became a “collective” member without compromising on how to name itself in April 1989. As a result, Beijing's counterpart withdrew from the IPSA. This situation has now persisted for over thirty years. The IPSA case not only challenges the current understanding of Cross-Strait relations but also throws light on the theoretical understanding of Track II diplomacy.

To what extent can de facto states act autonomously vis-à-vis their patron states and domestic societies? This article draws on theories of clientelism in international relations to develop a novel argument explaining the agency of de facto states. Examining two strategic triangles—Russia–Transnistria–Moldova and US–Taiwan–China—it demonstrates that interrelated domestic factors such as robust political competition, democratic pluralism, reimagined national identities, and big business shape the autonomy of de facto states in Eastern Europe and East Asia. Furthermore, the structured focused comparison of Transnistria and Taiwan indicates that the agency of de facto states declines when rising parent states and dissatisfied patron states challenge the status quo, engaging in great power competition. Their autonomy varies across areas of low and high politics, as patron states prioritize military-security issues and interfere less in the economic and cultural affairs of the de facto states.

Nacrite and dickite are found in two localities in northern Taiwan. One, containing nacrite and dickite, is associated with a gold-enargite deposit as a vug-filling clay in the Chinkushih (CKS) mine district near the northern coast. The other is the occurrence of dickite in the interstices of a Miocene coarse-grained quartzose sandstone in the Nanshihchiao (NSC) area, near Taipei city. X-ray diffraction (XRD), differential thermal analysis (DTA), scanning electron microscope (SEM), and petrographic examinations were used to characterize the mineralogical features. Nacrite most often takes the unusual form of rhombic platelets, and dickite is commonly elongated in habit with the shapes possibly related to their origin. Based on geological evidence, we believe that both nacrite and dickite are of hydrothermal origin. In the CKS area, the formation of nacrite and dickite is related to the hypogene gold-enargite mineralization. In contrast, the transformation of dickite in the NSC area is due to the influence of the raised temperatures of sandstone formation, resulting from volcanic activity during the Kungkuan stage after the deposition of the sandstone.

In this article, I examine the ROC president's discursive response to PRC efforts to limit Taiwan's future possibilities and undermine confidence in Taiwan's future. I argue that the capacity to imagine the future, and perceiving agency to affect future outcomes, is crucial for national resilience. Since Taiwan is routinely exposed to factors known to cause reduced self-efficacy and morale – uncertainty, threat, marginalization, restricted agency, circumscribed action repertoires – it is crucial that Taiwanese people have a meaningful sense of “what are we striving for?” and confidence that they have the agency to realize these aspirations. The article sets out an empirical examination of discursive constructions of the future as a vector for enhancing cohesion and resolve in Taiwanese society. Foregrounding a novel dimension in the study of Taiwan, the article contributes both an interpretivist account of President Tsai Ing-wen's discourse and opens a new avenue for research on the largely neglected issue of futurity in cross-Strait relations.