Perceptualism is a prominent theory analyzing emotions as perceptual experiences of value. A long-standing challenge to perceptualism says that emotions cannot be perceptual because they are subject to normative assessments in terms of reasons and rationality, while perceptual experiences are not. I defend perceptualism from this charge. My argument begins by distinguishing two forms of normative assessment: fundamental and non-fundamental. Perceptualism is compatible with the latter (i.e., non-fundamental reasons and rationality); even sensory experiences are so assessable. I next argue that emotions are only non-fundamentally assessable. Following this argument, I outline a perceptualist-friendly theory of emotions as non-fundamentally normatively assessable.

Existential happiness is happiness that one has a basic life at all. Having a basic life, as I understand it, involves being the subject of experiences and being an agent in some minimal sense. As I argue, existential happiness is a fitting response to having a basic life. To make this argument, I look at two possible accounts of the fittingness of existential happiness: the value of a basic life and attachment to the constitutive elements of one’s life. I also consider a few possible sources of existential happiness, including encounters with death, counterfactual thinking, and hedonically positive feelings of awe directed toward one’s own consciousness.

Threat perception provokes a range of behaviour, from cooperation to conflict. Correctly interpreting others’ behaviour, and responding optimally, is thought to be aided by ‘stepping into their shoes’ (i.e. mentalising) to understand the threats they have perceived. But IR scholarship on the effects of attempting this exercise has yielded mixed findings. One missing component in this research is a clear understanding of the link between effort and accuracy. I use a US-based survey experiment (study N = 839; pilot N = 297) and a novel analytic approach to study mentalising accuracy in the domain of threat perception. I find that accurately estimating why someone feels threatened by either climate change or illegal immigration is conditional on sharing a belief in the issue’s overall dangerousness. Similar beliefs about dangerousness are not proxies for shared political identities, and accuracy for those with dissimilar beliefs does not exceed chance. Focusing first on the emotional states of those who felt threatened did not significantly improve accuracy. These findings suggest that: (1) effort does not guarantee accuracy in estimating the threats others see; (2) emotion understanding may not be a solution to threat mis-estimation; and (3) misperception can arise from basic task difficulty, even without information constraints or deception.

The literature on emotion and risk-taking is large and heterogeneous. Whereas some studies have found that positive emotions increase risk-taking and negative emotions increase risk aversion, others have found just the opposite. In this study, we investigated this question in the context of a risky decision-making task with embedded high-resolution sampling of participants’ subjective emotional valence. Across two large-scale experiments (N = 329 and 524), we consistently found evidence for a negative association between self-reported emotional valence and risk-taking behaviors. That is, more negative subjective affect was associated with increased risk-seeking, and more positive subjective affect was associated with increased risk aversion. This effect was evident both when we compared participants with different levels of mean emotional valence as well as when we considered within-participant emotional fluctuations over the course of the task. Prospect-theoretic computational modeling analyses suggested that both between- and within-participant effects were driven by an effect of emotional valence on the curvature of the subjective utility function (i.e., increased risk tolerance in more negative emotional states), as well as by an effect of within-person emotion fluctuations on loss aversion. We interpret findings in terms of a tendency for participants in negative emotional states to choose high-risk, high-reward options in an attempt to improve their emotional state.

This article is inspired by two of Steven Burns's many philosophical interests — self-deception and Wittgenstein — as well as by a wariness that we share of the analytic-continental divide in contemporary philosophy. I argue here that, despite obvious differences of temperament and concern, Sartre and Wittgenstein share a scepticism about the “epistemic model” of first-person authority. This shared scepticism emerges in a striking way in their challenges to the idea that psychological phenomena should be understood on the model of objects in physical space. Wittgenstein's scepticism is more thorough-going, but emphasizing the similarity allows us to see Sartre as making an important contribution to our understanding of first-person authority, even if we are wary of the voluntarism of his approach.

As an African American deeply impacted by the personal and communal trauma from the police murder of George Floyd in May 2020 and alleged “racial reckoning” that took place globally immediately thereafter, I have personally wrestled with the responses of many non-Black persons to these events. Though the responses came from well-intentioned friends and colleagues trying to be helpful and conciliatory, they resonated as an empty refrain: “I don’t know what it means to be Black, but….” Each time I heard this refrain, I found myself pondering more deeply what and how these folks, and all folks, understand and practice empathy. My experiences and research revealed a similar concern that I witness across many situations in which people think they are being helpful when in fact they are not doing what real empathy requires – being with the person rather than trying to imagine what the person is going through. This article challenges the faulty ways that people have been taught to think about and practice empathy in hopes of offering a model that might facilitate in more meaningful ways ties that bind human hearts and minds.

This article examines the extent to which or how self-identified great powers resort to military aggression following events that challenge their sense of greatness. It problematises the prevalent notion that great powers and events exist and have effects independently of the narratives that constitute them. The article does this by engaging with Ontological Security Studies, Great Power Narcissism, and the psychology of vulnerable and grandiose narcissism, as well as by analysing Japanese identity narratives in two periods seemingly marked by equally challenging events – the Meiji era (1868–1912) and the post-war period (1950–71). It finds that Japan’s military aggression against China in 1894–5 was enabled by vulnerable narratives of shame and insult, while the decision to wage war with Russia a decade later was facilitated more by grandiose narratives. Despite Japan’s overwhelming defeat in the Second World War and the persistent desire among conservative elites for great power status and identity, however, overall post-war narratives did not feature similarly negative emotions and calls for revenge. Japanese great power aspirations were arguably curtailed in this period through intense narrative contestation, notably progressive counter-narratives featuring more self-reflective expressions of guilt and remorse, and even the self-reflexive desire for a non-great power identity.

The ability to manipulate brain function through the communication between the microorganisms in the gastrointestinal tract and the brain along the gut-brain axis has emerged as a potential option to improve cognitive and emotional health. Dietary composition and patterns have demonstrated a robust capacity to modulate the microbiota-gut-brain axis. With their potential to possess pre-, pro-, post-, and synbiotic properties, dietary fibre and fermented foods stand out as potent shapers of the gut microbiota and subsequent signalling to the brain. Despite this potential, few studies have directly examined the mechanisms that might explain the beneficial action of dietary fibre and fermented foods on the microbiota-gut-brain axis, thus limiting insight and treatments for brain dysfunction. Herein, we evaluate the differential effects of dietary fibre and fermented foods from whole food sources on cognitive and emotional functioning. Potential mediating effects of dietary fibre and fermented foods on brain health via the microbiota-gut-brain axis are described. Although more multimodal research that combines psychological assessments and biological sampling to compare each food type is needed, the evidence accumulated to date suggests that dietary fibre, fermented foods, and/or their combination within a psychobiotic diet can be a cost-effective and convenient approach to improve cognitive and emotional functioning across the lifespan.

Prosody includes the pitch, timing and loudness in speech, which can convey meaning and emotion. This study examines whether prosodic categories affect novel noun learning and whether the referent characteristic influence learning. Previous research showed that emotional prosody interfered with adults’ noun learning (West et al., 2017), but it had no effect on children (West et al., 2022). However, these researchers varied their method across ages, including animacy and complexity of the referent, and it is unclear if the results extend beyond the three emotional prosodies tested. Participants in the current set of studies heard novel words presented in five prosodic categories (within-subject) in order to learn the label for either animate or inanimate objects (between-subject). Study 1 compared inanimate objects and aliens, with better noun learning performance for inanimate objects. Study 2 compared inanimate objects with the same objects with faces added, but there was no difference in noun learning by object type. Both studies showed differences in noun learning by the prosodic category, with warning less accurate than naming. These results demonstrate how extralinguistic factors like prosody, attention and referent complexity influence noun learning.

This preregistered study replicates and extends studies concerning emotional response to wartime rally speeches and applies it to U.S. President Donald Trump’s first national address regarding the COVID-19 pandemic on March 11, 2020. We experimentally test the effect of a micro-expression (ME) by Trump associated with appraised threat on change in participant self-reported distress, sadness, anger, affinity, and reassurance while controlling for followership. We find that polarization is perpetuated in emotional response to the address which focused on portraying the COVID-19 threat as being of Chinese provenance. We also find a significant, albeit slight, effect by Trump’s ME on self-reported sadness, suggesting that this facial behavior served did not diminish his speech, instead serving as a form of nonverbal punctuation. Further exploration of participant response using the Linguistic Inventory and Word Count software reinforces and extends these findings.