The Cold War was the most important feature of the international system in the second half of the twentieth century. The rivalry between the Soviet Union and the United States shaped the contours of conflict and cooperation among states and peoples between 1945 and 1991 and its dynamics permeated almost all corners of the globe. Whether in Baghdad, Bangkok or Brussels, the influence of geopolitical and ideological conflict was unmistakable. The Cold War created rivalries and political faultlines that have continued to shape international relations years after its passing. Sino-American competition has become so intense that many think the world is on the brink of another period of bipolar rivalry.

Continuing from the account of Iran–South Africa relations in Chapter 3, this chapter looks in particular at the increasing importance of Iranian oil to South Africa in the wake of the 1973 Arab oil embargo, as a result of which, by 1978, Iran supplied over 90 per cent of South Africa’s crude oil imports. Because of its importance as a supplier of oil, not just to South Africa but also its neighbouring countries, Iran attained an influential position in Southern Africa during this period. Its influence was such that in 1977 and 1978, the United States and Britain asked the shah to help negotiate a settlement with the Ian Smith government to end the crisis in Rhodesia. The chapter explores Iran’s role in the crisis, not only its support of US-British initiatives, but also its outreach to Rhodesia’s revolutionary politicians, like Joshua Nkomo, who travelled to Iran and met with the shah several times during this period. As the chapter will show, Iran’s involvement was driven by concerns over the possibility of civil war spreading into neighbouring countries, and the implications of this for Iran’s Indian Ocean aspirations.

In this chapter we give a brief overview of corporate governance in the United States (‘US’), the United Kingdom (‘UK’), New Zealand, Canada, South Africa, India and Singapore, some of the major Anglo-American corporate governance jurisdictions that are based on the unitary (one-tier) board model. In Chapter 12 we deal with corporate governance developments in the European Union (‘EU’), the G20/OECD Principles of Corporate Governance, and corporate governance in Germany, Japan and China. The Principles include traditional Anglo-American corporate governance principles but go wider – as well as principles applying to a traditional unitary board structure, they include principles applying to a typical two-tier board structure.

Chapter Four focuses on US compliance with international law. The perception of former officials was that US compliance with international law was robust. When asked about the reasons that the United States complies or does not comply with international law, the former officials’ responses tracked many of the factors they listed for states in general. The chapter then explores the interplay between law and policy, exploring how policymakers balance these competing concerns. Former officials were clear that while international law was generally followed, it was not always dispositive. Legal issues were considered as one factor among a variety of factors, essentially involving a cost–benefit analysis. The salient considerations driving compliance or noncompliance, as revealed in the interviews, appeared to be the nature of the national interest or policy at stake; the nature and significance of the international legal rule involved ethical considerations; the views of allies; the ambiguity or precision of the legal obligation; and the weight of domestic political and bureaucratic concerns. The chapter next examines factors that may affect policymaker perceptions, including party affiliation, and concludes with a description of instances where the United States either bent international law or complied scrupulously.

The chapter provides a detailed analysis of global managerialism, the core ideological content of the radical Right’s understanding of the world. In this view, the essence of contemporary world politics is not the age-old story of realist power politics, the liberal tale of progress through institutions, or the corrosive spread of neoliberal capitalism. It is instead the rise to power of a global liberal managerial elite, the so-called New Class of experts and bureaucrats. Detached and unmoored from their national identities and cultures, the interests of this elite lie in yet further globalisation and liberalisation that erodes traditional national values and local communities. This managerialist sociology provides the radical Right and its supporters with a common enemy – the global liberal elite – which may have different faces in different geographical locations, but that nevertheless facilitates powerful equivalences and transversal alliances that spans nations and regions.

This chapter examines security and Australian foreign policy during 2016–2020 using two strands. It shows that Australia confronted both the ‘high politics’ issues that are the stuff of traditional foreign policy, as well as the unconventional security challenges to which Australia had to adapt. We begin by considering Australia’s conventional security politics, and the three consistent strands in Australia’s security thinking: how Australia fits into a world of super powers and the balancing act it must conduct to do so; relatedly, its alliance with the Unitd States; and Australia’s role in multilateral organisations. We then assess the so-called ‘unconventional’ security issues and their impact on Australian national security. Our analysis reveals that Australia’s responses to unconventional threats were increasingly conventional and relied on domestic tools to solve international problems. Some new threats seemed to bring international tools, like the military, to bear on domestic problems. Moreover, we demonstrate that the security environment was increasingly defined by the ‘grey zone’ – acts that reside between war and peace and take on unconventional forms.

Not only money crossed the ocean: letters between the French orphans and their benefactors went in each direction across the Atlantic. The correspondence between France’s orphans supported through the FCFS and their American benefactors revealed both the power of the connection and the power dynamic between the recipients and the “godparents.” Letters from the fatherless children of France told of the moral and psychological support that accompanied the financial assistance that sponsorships provided. And while it seems that the correspondence helped open an ocean of hope and fostered the conviction that France was not alone in its fight against Germany, the letters from France also reflected the power dynamic of the sponsorship: those in need had to keep the assistance coming. The letters also show the FCFS at work: the instructions to the recipients of aid as to how they were to communicate with donors; the typed transcription and translations of the letters, most likely carried out by women in the Paris and New York offices; and the messaging to the benefactors, who were reminded that mothers needed money, but children cared more for the attention from a far-away friend.

Ensuring the future of France – its children – meant fighting on multiple dimensions. One set of enemies included infectious diseases, especially tuberculosis and the influenza pandemic; the other set comprises illnesses and infant mortality attendant to poverty and malnutrition. Thousands of volunteers from the United States fought these battles with treatment and prevention strategies. They toured the Franco-American colonies, organized large antiepidemic campaigns, and produced leaflets providing practical advice on managing the care of babies and children during wartime. With the help of the Children’s Bureau of the American Red Cross, the American Commission for the Prevention of Tuberculosis in France, and the Rockefeller Foundation’s International Health Division, thousands of leaflets were distributed to the Franco-American colonies of the CFAPCF, fatherless children supported through the FCFS, as well as to schools and mothers across France. With the spread of tuberculosis in 1917 and the 1918 influenza pandemic, American medical experts realized that a sanitary ironclad was needed to block the spread of contagious diseases to the United States: to protect France was to protect the United States.

This chapter describes the re-emergence of great-power competition between the United States and China, discusses how it reshaped the external environment and strategic space for Australia’s foreign policy, and examines how Canberra responded to it between 2016 and 2020.

The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) brought to greater prominence a question that has long vexed Australian foreign policy-makers: could they avoid choosing between the US security alliance and Australia’s complementary economic ties with China? Given the immense political capital invested in the BRI by Chinese leader Xi Jinping, it was perhaps inevitable that Australia – like many other countries – had to declare its position. By so doing, however, Australia was forced to reckon with an issue that pitted its security interests directly against its economic ones. This chapter traces Australia’s evolving position on the BRI from 2016 to 2020, its interrelated justifications for rejecting the BRI, and the political and economic consequences of the decision. We show that debate over the BRI disrupted a longstanding consensus about the centrality of free trade and investment to Australian foreign economic policy. The BRI, we argue, signified a turning away from Australia’s previously enthusiastic support for global free trade to a more qualified security-sensitive approach.

As soon as World War I broke out, American citizens established an important wartime relief organization that was effective in providing refuge to child war victims from France’s northern and eastern regions. The Committee Franco-American for the Protection of the Children of the Frontier (CFAPCF), the first Franco-American response aimed at ensuring the protection of France’s children, provided financial and material assistance to rescue, shelter, heal, and educate displaced, injured, ill, and orphaned children. It collaborated with groups of nuns who ran some of the colonies, with teachers in charge of schooling and with American health experts overseeing provisions of sanitary conditions and hygiene. American women traveled to France and worked in the Franco-American colonies. In addition to caring for the children, they taught them about their friendly nation whose people were helping to ensure their survival. Running a network of colonies across France required considerable human and material resources, and the CFAPCF drew on social networks of wealthy French citizens and American expatriates eager to shield France’s children from hunger, destitution, and death. Shipments of clothing, garments, books, toys, and other gifts from the United States signaled the Americans’ mobilization to save France’s orphans.

In the aftermath of the war, a new form of commemoration and memorialization took place, centered around the adoption of fatherless children as a substitute to the loss of a son. French orphans were part of a process merging remembrance and humanitarian action. In vast cemeteries across France, the sacrifice of American soldiers was honored on special occasions, with the sponsored orphans and school children placing wreaths of flowers on their tombs. In parallel, the FCFS launched another campaign of sponsorships to reduce infant mortality. With its local branches across the United States, the FCFS capitalized on its ability to reach out to local communities and thus staved off the indifference that can set in after a crisis has seemed to pass. With its other communication strategies still in place, the FCFS saw continued success, testament to its deep popularity across the United States. Between the end of 1918 and 1921, the response of the United States was such that the number of sponsored orphans increased from 80,000 to 300,000.

The period from 2016 to 2020 was dominated by the rivalry between China and the United States, and by Australia’s relative position amid this rivalry. At the same time, a debate about how to combat climate change and its role in foreign affairs took place in the backdrop to this great-power rivalry. In this chapter we examine the interaction of political and public commentary around these three issues – the United States, China and climate change – with the insights available from polling data. We also examine how opinion on these issues fed into ongoing and longstanding debates. Our results suggest that there was both continuity and change in public opinion on international affairs between 2016 and 2020. Trust in the two great powers declined significantly. At the same time, support for Australia’s military alliance with the US remained strong. In terms of threat perceptions, concerns around climate change remained high, reflecting a lack of policy certainty and a failure to act decisively at the federal level. Accompanying this steady trend of high concern around climate-based security risks was a sharp increase in the perception of China as a potential threat to Australian security interests.