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A second-person approach cannot explain intentionality in social understanding

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  25 July 2013

Chris Moore  and
Markus Paulus
Chris Moore
Affiliation:
Psychology Department, Dalhousie University, Halifax, NS B3H 4R2, Canada. moorec@dal.ca
Markus Paulus
Affiliation:
Psychology Department, Ludwig Maximilian University, 80539 Munich, Germany. markus.paulus@lmu.de
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Abstract

A second-person approach that prioritizes dyadic emotional interaction is not well equipped to explain the origins of the understanding of mind conceived as intentionality. Instead, the critical elements that will deliver the understanding of self and other as persons with intentionality are shared object-centered interactions that include not only emotional engagement, but also joint attention and joint goal-directed action.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 36 , Issue 4 , August 2013 , pp. 430 - 431
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2013 

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