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Second-person social neuroscience: Connections to past and future theories, methods, and findings
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 25 July 2013
Abstract
We argue that Schilbach et al. have neglected an important part of the social neuroscience literature involving participants in social interactions. We also clarify some part of the models the authors discussed superficially. We finally propose that social neuroscience should take into consideration the effect of being observed and the complexity of the task as potentially influencing factors.
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- Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2013
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Target article
Toward a second-person neuroscience1
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Author response
A second-person neuroscience in interaction1