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A limited skeptical threat

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  27 March 2018

Joshua May
Joshua May*
Affiliation:
Philosophy Department, University of Alabama at Birmingham, Birmingham, AL 35294-1260. joshmay@uab.eduwww.joshdmay.com
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Abstract

Doris argues that our choices are heavily influenced by forces that we wouldn't count as genuine reasons. This unsettling conclusion is motivated by a debunking argument so wide-ranging that it isn't foisted upon us by the sciences. Doris sometimes seems to lower his ambitions when offering instead a skeptical hypothesis argument, but that conflicts with his aims in the book.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 41 , 2018 , e52
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2018 

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