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Meta-criteria to formulate criteria of consciousness

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  23 March 2022

Boris Kotchoubey Open the ORCID record for Boris Kotchoubey [Opens in a new window]
Boris Kotchoubey*
Affiliation:
Institute of Medical Psychology and Behavioral Neurobiology, University of Tübingen, 72076Tübingen, Germany. Boris.kotchoubey@uni-tuebingen.de
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Abstract

Any neurobiological model claiming explanation of a complex human phenomenon should start with an explicit definition of the explanandum. If a classical intensional definition is impossible, we can use a descriptive definition by listing necessary criteria (e.g., of consciousness). This commentary suggests four meta-criteria that different proposed criteria of consciousness should fulfill: phenomenological consensus, empirical evidence, domain specificity, and non-circularity.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 45 , 2022 , e53
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Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2022. Published by Cambridge University Press

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