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Article contents
IIT is ideally positioned to explain perceptual phenomena
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 23 March 2022
Abstract
The target article's critique of the integrated information theory (IIT) of consciousness is misguided on several fronts, which I hope are addressed in other comments, but here I focus on the connection (or supposed lack thereof) between IIT and rigorous phenomenology, and IIT's connection to the psychophysics of perception.
- Type
- Open Peer Commentary
- Information
- Copyright
- Copyright © The Author(s), 2022. Published by Cambridge University Press
References
Balduzzi, D., & Tononi, G. (2009). Qualia: The geometry of integrated information. PLoS Computational Biology, 5(8), e1000462.10.1371/journal.pcbi.1000462CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Haun, A., & Tononi, G. (2019). Why does space feel the way it does? Towards a principled account of spatial experience. Entropy, 21(12), 1160. https://doi.org/10.3390/e21121160CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Tononi, G. (2014). The conscious grid (response to Scott Aaronson). Retrieved from http://integratedinformationtheory.org/download/conscious_grid.pdfGoogle Scholar
Target article
The integrated information theory of consciousness: A case of mistaken identity
Related commentaries (23)
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Functional theories can describe many features of conscious phenomenology but cannot account for its existence
IIT is ideally positioned to explain perceptual phenomena
IIT, half masked and half disfigured
Is the neuroscientist's grandmother in the notebook? Integrated information and reference frames in the search for consciousness
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Searching in the wrong place: Might consciousness reside in the brainstem?
The disintegrated theory of consciousness: Sleep, waking, and meta-awareness
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To be or to know? Information in the pristine present
What is exactly the problem with panpsychism?
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Author response
The integrated information theory of consciousness: Unmasked and identified