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To be or to know? Information in the pristine present

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  23 March 2022

Larissa Albantakis Open the ORCID record for Larissa Albantakis [Opens in a new window]
Larissa Albantakis*
Affiliation:
Department of Psychiatry, Center for Sleep and Consciousness, University of Wisconsin–Madison, Madison, WI53719, USA. albantakis@wisc.eduhttps://centerforsleepandconsciousness.psychiatry.wisc.edu/people/larissa-albantakis/
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Abstract

To be true of every experience, the axioms of Integrated information theory (IIT) are necessarily basic properties and should not be “over-psychologized.” Information, for example, merely asserts that experience is specific, not generic. It does not require “access.” The information a system specifies about itself in its current state is revealed by its unfolded cause–effect structure and quantified by its integrated information.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 45 , 2022 , e42
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Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2022. Published by Cambridge University Press

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References

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