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Talking to others: The importance of responsibility attributions by observers
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 27 March 2018
Abstract
This commentary extends Doris's approach of agency by highlighting the importance of responsibility attributions by observers. We argue that (a) social groups determine which standards are relevant and which actors are responsible, (b) consensus about these attributions may correct individual defeaters, and (c) the attribution of moral responsibility reveals agency of observers and may foster the actors' agency.
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- Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2018
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