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The tangled web of agency

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  27 March 2018

Alain Pe-Curto
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, College of Arts and Sciences, The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, Chapel Hill, NC 27599-3125; alain.pecurto@unc.eduhttp://philosophy.unc.edu/people/alain-pe-curto/
Julien A. Deonna
Affiliation:
Swiss Center for Affective Sciences and Department of Philosophy at the Faculty of Humanities, Université de Genève, 1202 Geneva, Switzerland. julien.deonna@unige.chdavid.sander@unige.chhttp://www.affective-sciences.org/en/home/cisa/members/julien-deonna/http://www.affective-sciences.org/en/home/cisa/members/david-sander/
David Sander
Affiliation:
Swiss Center for Affective Sciences and Department of Philosophy at the Faculty of Humanities, Université de Genève, 1202 Geneva, Switzerland. julien.deonna@unige.chdavid.sander@unige.chhttp://www.affective-sciences.org/en/home/cisa/members/julien-deonna/http://www.affective-sciences.org/en/home/cisa/members/david-sander/

Abstract

We characterize Doris's anti-reflectivist, collaborativist, valuational theory along two dimensions. The first dimension is social entanglement, according to which cognition, agency, and selves are socially embedded. The second dimension is disentanglement, the valuational element of the theory that licenses the anchoring of agency and responsibility in distinct actors. We then present an issue for the account: the problem of bad company.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2018 

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