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There's more to consider than knowledge and belief
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 19 November 2021
Abstract
Phillips et al. present a number of arguments for the premise that knowledge is more basic than belief. Although their arguments are coherent and sound, they do not directly address numerous cases in which belief appears to be a developmental precursor to knowledge. I describe several examples, not necessarily as a direct challenge, but rather to better understand their framework.
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- Open Peer Commentary
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- Copyright © The Author(s), 2021. Published by Cambridge University Press
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Target article
Knowledge before belief
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Author response
Actual knowledge